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WAS SHARI’AH INDEED THE CULPRIT? 
 
Introduction: 
There is no doubt that Islam was the leading civilization during the period 
seventh-thirteenth centuries. Its achievements in sciences and philosophy are 
well known.1 Its achievements in establishing efficient economic/financial 
institutions and how these had been borrowed by the medieval West are also 
now well documented.2 Yet, in sharp contrast to these early achievements, 
Islamic world presently is considered to be as one of the most backward regions 
of the world. Timur Kuran has argued that the Islamic law of inheritance and 
the rigidity of Muslim jurists have impeded the development of the corporate 
form and consequently condemned businesses established by Muslims to small 
size and short life span. 
The Corporation: 
                                                            
1 Sezgin, Einführung. 
2 Çizakça, “Cross-cultural Borrowing”. 
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Though important, corporations do not constitute a sufficient condition for 
economic development. Thus a civilization may have invented the corporate 
form, but this does not mean that it will achieve economic development. This is 
best demonstrated by China, where for all practical purposes the corporation 
had been invented during the sixteenth century Chinese commercial revolution. 
But as it is well known, China never made the transition from commercial 
capitalism to industrial capitalism. The Chinese corporation, the tang, alone, 
was simply not sufficient for the task.3 In any capitalist civilization the 
corporation needs to be supported by a host of other principles and institutions 
such as the rule of law, freedoms and democratic institutions. Whether these 
principles are compatible with the basic teachings of Islam is a difficult question 
that is being discussed elsewhere.4  
A corporation is an association of individuals with common interest, who come 
together for a specific purpose. This association, as if it were a living being, is 
considered to have its own personality. This is of course a fictitious (or judicial) 
personality and is distinct from those of its real members. Consequently, 
although these individual members may die or exit from the association, the 
                                                            
3 Faure, China and Capitalism.  
4 A huge literature is emerging on this question. For a few examples see; Mirakhor and 
Hamid, Islam and Development; Islam, Freedom of Religion; Kamali, An Introduction; id., 
Freedom of Expression; Çizakça, “Democracy”.  
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corporation continues to have a distinct life of its own. The corporation can own 
property in its own name separately from its members. It can also contact third 
persons in its own name. It can sue third parties and be sued by them. It can 
discipline its own members. A great advantage of the corporation is that it 
provides both “owner shielding”, limited liability for members, and “entity 
shielding”, limited liability for the company itself.5 In the former, the personal 
assets of an individual partner are protected from the creditors of other partners 
and in the latter those of the corporation. Furthermore, because the corporation 
outlives the lives of its members and provides sufficient entity shielding, it 
enjoys longevity and allows capital accumulation. This is one of the reasons 
why western corporations had substantially more capital at their disposal than 
un-incorporated Islamic partnerships.6 
The Catholic church was organized, probably, as one of the very first 
corporations. Thus, it is generally accepted that the most important corporate 
body emerged in Europe sometime between 1075 and 1122 A.D., the period 
marked by the Investiture Struggle. But, its application to commerce came 
                                                            
5 Hansmann, “Law”, pp. 1337-43.  
6 Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, pp. 130-31, 134. 
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about much later, during the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, with the advent of 
the East India companies.7 
Theories Explaining the Lack of Corporations in the Islamic World: 
The massive accumulation of capital and consequently power achieved by 
western corporations, which enabled them to colonize vast territories overseas, 
invited the question whether such organizations ever developed in the Islamic 
world. The answer, with the possible exception of the wealthy Karimi 
merchants, was negative.8 It was observed that powerful incorporated private 
companies with massive capital accumulation and power did not exist in the 
heart-lands of the Ottoman empire which covered much of the Islamic world.9 
This observation naturally triggered further research and scholars tried to 
explain this absence. Indeed, why is it that the Islamic world, the probable 
inventor of commenda, the most important contract form of medieval Europe, 
failed to proceed with the evolution and did not invent the next big thing – the 
corporation?10 
                                                            
7 For a more precise explanation see the section: “The Geographical Factor”, below. 
8 On the Karimi merchants see; Labib, “Capitalism”, pp. 82-3 and Constable, Trade and 
Traders, pp. 147, 254-55. 
9 Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, passim. 
10 On the very likely Islamic origins of the commenda see; Udovitch, “At the Origins”, and 
on the debate about the origins; Çizakça, Comparative Evolution. 
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Several explanations have been provided for the failure of Muslims to develop 
the corporate form. First of all, as already mentioned, the corporation was 
invented by the Catholic Church seeking legitimacy and independence from the 
secular authority, the Holy Roman Emperor. This was a unique western 
European phenomenon. Indeed, the Eastern Orthodox Church in the 
Roman/Byzantine Empire was subjugated by the Emperor in Constantinople 
and could not develop as an independent power. In the Islamic world also with 
the rise of the Buwayhid dynasty, after 945 A.D., the Caliphs, though continued 
to be respected, in fact, became de facto subjects of the sultans. In short, while 
the Roman Catholic Church emerged in the west as an independent centre of 
power and needed to organize itself as a corporation, this need was felt neither 
in Orthodox Christianity nor in the world of Islam.  
Second, Avner Greif has argued that whereas the Islamic world was dominated 
by extended family and tribes, Western Europe became dominated by the 
nuclear family. This happened when the Catholic Church prohibited polygamy 
and discouraged endogamic marriages up to four degrees of kindred and 
declared incest a sin and crime. When the nuclear family emerged out of all this 
as the dominant social formation, an institutional vacuum was created. This 
vacuum was filled by corporations, which rapidly spread to the independent 
cities, guilds and universities. Thus, Greif argues, the Europeans developed the 
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corporation as a substitute for what was missing in the west – the extended 
family.11 
Third, Kuran explains the small size and short duration of Islamic partnerships 
as well as the absence of the corporate form in the Islamic world, by focusing 
on the Islamic inheritance and partnership laws. He claims that, according to the 
latter, an Islamic partnership ends when one of the partners dies. In the absence 
of primogeniture, according to Kuran, it is not possible for the eldest male heir 
of the deceased partner to replace him automatically. Therefore, if the enterprise 
is to continue, a new partnership has to be negotiated.12 Consequently, every 
additional partner increased the risk of premature liquidation. Thus, keeping the 
partnership to a minimum number of partners as well as limiting its planned 
duration were rational policies.  
Fourth, still another obstacle to large Islamic partnerships, again, according to 
Kuran, was that they lacked judicial personality. This meant that third parties 
had to deal with partners as individuals rather than as representatives of an 
enterprise with its own life span and legal personality. Consequently, they 
avoided providing services or loans beyond the financial capacity of the 
particular partner they were dealing with. This must have resulted with a credit 
                                                            
11 Harris, “The Commenda and the Corporation”, p. 31. 
12 Kuran, “Islamic Commercial Crisis”,  pp. 421-22. 
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crunch, because an Islamic partnership could never obtain credit from third 
parties beyond what its individual partners could cover with their own means. 
Another reason why Islamic partnerships faced credit crunch was the much 
higher transactions costs of collecting the credit advanced from the various 
individual partners, each necessitating a separate litigation. By contrast, lending 
to a corporation has the advantage that in case of conflict a single litigation 
against the judicial personality of the corporation should suffice.  
Fifth, Kuran has argued further that Islamic law of inheritance and the multitude 
of heirs it led to were other important impediments for the introduction of the 
corporate form into the Islamic world.13 When one of the partners died, Islamic 
law demanded that the partnership must be liquidated, often prematurely. But 
the cost of liquidation depended on the number of heirs. By requiring the 
division of the deceased partner’s property among numerous heirs, Islamic law, 
according to Kuran, raised the cost of liquidation. Moreover, the very multitude 
of these heirs impeded the continuation of the enterprise as well. This is 
because, if the enterprise was to continue, each one of these heirs needed to be 
included in the partnership as new members replacing the deceased partner. By 
contrast, in many parts of Europe, where primogeniture prevailed, the eldest son 
of the deceased partner automatically replaced him and the association, whether 
in the form of a partnership or corporation, continued usually without any major 
                                                            
13 “The Absence”, p. 816. 
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problem. In short, the transactions costs pertaining to the intergenerational 
continuity of Islamic partnerships must have been significantly higher than 
those of western partnerships. Kuran argues that due to these reasons, partners 
must have deliberately limited the size and duration of their partnerships.14 This 
meant that the corporate form was simply not desired or needed in the Islamic 
world. Kuran recognizes that Muslim jurists could have introduced the 
corporate form. If they did not, according to him, the reasons should be sought 
in a lack of need caused by the rigidity of the Shari’ah rather than an inability to 
innovate. 
A Critique: 
I will now provide here a critique of these explanations for the lack of the 
corporate form and its consequence, the small size and duration of Islamic 
partnerships in the Islamic world.  
The corporation was indeed an invention of the Roman Catholic Church. By 
contrast, neither the Eastern Orthodox Church nor the Islamic Caliphate could 
claim to be independent of the secular power of the emperor or the sultan. Not 
seeking, or even daring to seek such power, these religious institutions hardly 
needed to incorporate. 
                                                            
14 ibid. 
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Greif’s argument that the Europeans developed the corporation as a substitute 
for the missing extended family, is a weak one.  This argument suffers from the 
fact that Islamic cities, where the corporation would have flourished, were not 
necessarily characterised by extended families or tribes. These were prevalent in 
rural areas or deserts. Moreover, the existence of extended families in the 
Islamic world is a highly controversial subject.15 True, polygamous urban 
Islamic families might have been larger than monogamous European families, 
but the claim that this impeded the adoption of the corporate form is not entirely 
convincing. 
Kuran’s argument that an Islamic partnership must be immediately liquidated 
upon the death of one of the partners is also problematic. Kuran, based upon 
Avram Udovitch and Udovitch based upon the classical jurist Kasani, have 
argued that when one of the partners dies, an Islamic enterprise has to be 
immediately liquidated and the assets distributed among the surviving partners 
and the decedent’s heirs.16 For Kuran, this constitutes one of the most important 
causes behind the lack of capital accumulation and ephemeral nature of Islamic 
partnerships. But when we check other sources, we find certain complications.17 
                                                            
15 Powers, “Inheritance System”, pp. 14-15.  
16 Kuran, “Commercial Crisis“, p. 421. 
17 İbn Abidin, Redd al-Muhtar, vol. 9, pp. 184-208;  Kuwait Ministry of Awqaf, Al-Mavsuat, 
vol. 26, p. 89; Gözübenli, “Inan”, pp. 260-61; Siddiqi, Partnership and Profit-Sharing, p. 93; 
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To start with, liquidation of an Islamic partnership upon the death of one of the 
partners, depends on the actual number of partners.18 This is confirmed by 
paragraph 1352 of the Ottoman law code, known as the Mecelle, which is based 
upon the classical Islamic-Hanefite law. The Mecelle states that if only two 
partners are involved, the company indeed needs to be liquidated whenever one 
of them dies. But under the same circumstances this code clearly permits the 
continuation of an Islamic enterprise (şirket) with three partners or more. In this 
case, only the shares of the deceased partner are to be converted into cash and 
paid to his inheritors, but the company itself will continue to live with the 
surviving partners.19  
It is possible that the inconsistency is due to the different partnerships 
considered: whereas Kuran, based upon Udovitch, refers to the liquidation of a 
mudaraba partnership, the Mecelle reference is more general. Ömer Nasuhi 
Bilmen also mentions the immediate liquidation of a mudaraba, but clearly 
confirms the continuation of an inan partnership with more than two partners.20 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Billah, Applied Islamic Law, p. 54; Çizakça and Kenanoğlu, “Ottoman Merchants”, pp. 195-
215. 
18 Gözübenli, ibid., p. 261. 
19 Berki, Açıklamalı Mecelle, p. 277. 
20 Bilmen, Kamus, vol. 7, p. 86. 
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Thus, when he insisted that at the death of any one partner, all partnerships 
immediately had to be liquidated, Udovitch apparently had based his entire 
argument on the implicit assumption that the partnership had only two 
partners.21 But providing these partnerships had more than two members, 
liquidation was not necessary. 
It is clear that Udovitch’s implicit assumption has inadvertently misled Kuran. 
In other words, providing there are more than two partners, Islamic law does 
provide one of the greatest advantages of western law, namely the longevity of 
the firm. 
The other argument of Kuran that lack of primogeniture and multitude of heirs 
in Islamic inheritance law increase transaction costs leading to short life of 
firms and lack of capital accumulation is also not entirely correct.22 His 
argument is as follows:  
“...the mudaraba... became null and void if any partner died before 
fulfillment of the selected mission...The greater the number of heirs, the 
lower the capacity to renegotiate a new partnership aimed at completing 
the initially contracted mission. The prevailing inheritance system 
mattered, then, to contractual practices. In mandating the division of 
                                                            
21 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, pp. 117-18, 140. 
22 Kuran, “Why”, pp. 78-79.     
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estates among a potentially very long list of relatives, the Islamic 
inheritance system created incentives for keeping partnerships small”.    
I disagree with Kuran’s argument that the Islamic law of inheritance “created 
incentives for keeping partnerships small” for a number of reasons. First, 
Islamic law allows family waqfs, waqf ahli. If a wealthy Muslim wants his most 
able offspring to manage his wealth, he could transform his wealth into a family 
waqf and put his preferred offspring in charge of this waqf. In this way, even 
primogeniture could be applied notwithstanding the Islamic law of inheritance. 
Kuran has argued that a waqf cannot substitute for a firm, primarily because it 
suffers from information asymmetry problems. However, not only waqfs were 
permitted to make profits so as to channel these to charity, they could also have  
been protected from information asymmetry problems by preparing sufficiently 
flexible endowment deeds. 
14 
 
Second, and more importantly, even in those areas of the Islamic world where 
the classical law of inheritance is applied,23 the problem of multitude of heirs 
could be avoided much more directly, again, by the same law. This is because 
the rules of inheritance take effect only at the moment of death. This means that 
a proprietor is legally free to dispose of his property in any way he sees fit prior 
to his final death sickness. Indeed, Islamic law imposes no limitations 
whatsoever upon the amount of property that a person may alienate in the form 
of a gift during his life time, whether in favour of his eventual heirs or anyone 
else.24 Indeed, it has been stated that during health, a gift which may be of any 
amount can be given to any individual, rich or poor, who accepts the offer of the 
                                                            
23 In any case, in many areas of the Islamic world, such as Algeria, Sumatra, Nigeria, India 
and Java, customary law rather than the strict Islamic law of inheritance prevails. See on this; 
D. S. Powers, “Inheritance System”, p. 14. In Sumatra and Negeri Sambilan, Malays of 
Minangkabau decent practice adat perpatih, whereby daughters become the only rightful 
heirs to all the property of the deceased. Rosly, Critical Issues, p. 511. This is based upon the 
view that women do not possess the capacity to create wealth while men, who are stronger, 
do.  
 
24 Powers,”Inheritance System,” p. 21. This is confirmed by Canan, who has shown that 
although subject to debate, unequal gift giving among the offsprings has been approved by 
some of the greatest classical scholars (Abu Hanife, al-Shafi’i, Ahmad, Abu Yusuf and Imam 
Mohammad). See; Canan,  Kütüb-i Sitte, vol. 16, p. 254. 
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gift. But the underlying condition to this is that transfer of the gift must occur 
before the death of the donor, otherwise it becomes a bequest and be subjected 
to the general rules. Thus, if the recipient does not take possession of the gift 
before the donor dies then the gift becomes void but if the gift is taken into 
possession before the donor’s death, then it is valid according to the Hanafi, 
Shafi`i and Hanbali fikh. The Maliki school merely states that a gift made 
during death sickness is inoperative and is silent about a gift made during 
health.25 
Another way of exercising primogeniture or preferring one of the offspring was 
the following: a proprietor who wants to favour one of his children over the 
others could make a bequest for the benefit of his minor grandchild, the child of 
the person he wants to favour. As a minor, the child’s property would be 
administered by his father – the desired heir. If the proprietor did not have a 
grand child at the time that he wrote down his testament, he could leave a 
legacy for “the first child born to my son” or to “all children who will be born to 
my son”. In this manner the unborn child’s father could gain control of the 
property upon the testator’s death. Thus a far sighted proprietor, who wanted to 
exercise greater control over the way his property is transmitted to the next 
                                                            
25 Hussain, Succession, p. 410. 
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generation could certainly do so providing he made a testament while still in 
good health.26  
It was also always possible to reach an agreement with the sisters to continue 
the family firm. This is what the Ibn Yagmur brothers did in seventeenth 
century Cairo. When their father died without making a will and the assets were 
divided among all the children, the sons reached an agreement with their sisters 
to pool and recombine the capital of the family firm. In this agreement the 
sisters most probably became passive partners of the active brothers.27 In short, 
Kuran’s argument that “the Islamic inheritance system created incentives for 
keeping partnerships small”, is also not entirely convincing because it was 
possible to avoid the excessive divisiveness of the law by making gifts inter 
vivos or by establishing family waqfs with sufficiently flexible endowment 
deeds and entrusting the management of the trust to the preferred offspring. 
Thus, it is clear that, at least theoretically, it was possible to transfer wealth to a 
preferred child and avoid excessive fragmentation of property through the law 
of inheritance. But to what extent these theoretical possibilities were actually 
practiced needs to be searched thoroughly in the Islamic court registers. For the 
time being some evidence confirming the above has already appeared. Indeed, 
                                                            
26 Powers, “Inheritance System”, p. 21.    
27 Hanna, Big Money, p. 41. 
17 
 
according to Hudson in late Ottoman Damascus gift giving and endowments 
prevailed. There is strong evidence that people who controlled significant 
resources fought the restrictions by gift giving and establishing family 
endowments. Properties, particulary houses, were given as gifts. Also waqfs 
were endowed with the condition that the revenues to be generated were to be 
distributed among the beneficiaries determined by the founder.28 
Third, Kuran’s argument that the third parties “avoided providing services or 
loans beyond the financial capacity of the particular partner they were dealing 
with” ignores the popular contract form the wujuh or the sharikat al-mafalis 
also known as the “credit partnership” or the “partnership of the penniless”. As 
the name suggests, this was a partnership formed by bankrupt merchants, who 
had lost everything except their good reputation. It was customary practice for 
merchants to help their colleagues by supplying them with commodities for sale 
even though the value of these commodities may have been way above their 
means. The goods would be purchased on deferred payment and re-sold to third 
parties on cash. After repeating this a few times, the profits would be partially 
used to make the deferred payment. The essence of this partnership was to 
provide finance to colleagues with good reputation so as to enable them to re-
enter the market.  
                                                            
28 Hudson, Cultural Capital, pp. 49-57. 
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Naturally, the mere existence of this particular partnership in classical law 
books does not necessarily prove that it was actually used in practice. But 
documents found in the Ottoman archives have demonstrated that it was used 
frequently among the merchants.29 Thus, I reject Kuran’s argument that due to 
the lack of the corporate form Muslim merchants provided finance to their 
colleagues only up to the amount each could carry. Islamic law as well as 
economic history demonstrate that this was simply not the case. On the 
contrary, it was established custom to advance credits to colleagues with good 
reputation. This custom was so wide-spread that the law provided special 
partnership forms precisely for this purpose. Indeed, if the provision of finance 
even to the bankrupt was possible, wide-spread and well organized, the 
argument that  “the third parties avoided providing services or loans beyond the 
financial capacity of the particular partner they were dealing with” appears to be 
totally unconvincing.  
Kuran’s argument that due to the lack of judicial personality litigation costs 
were much higher because each partner had to be litigated separately, is also not 
convincing. This is because, in Mufawada partnerships concerning “the rights 
and obligations arising from any purchase or sale in connection with their joint 
enterprise, the mufawada partners are, from the point of view of third parties, 
like one individual. The price of a purchase made by one of them is collectable 
                                                            
29 Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, pp. 82-83. 
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from the other”.30 Thus if, in order to obtain credit, merchants felt the need to 
provide their creditors unlimited liability for the actions of their partners, it was 
certainly possible to do so by entering into a mufawada partnership. Moreover, 
in such a situation the upper limit to the credit would be determined not by the 
financial capacity of a single partner but by the aggregate capacity of all the 
mufawada partners. Most importantly, in case of conflict it would not be 
necessary, as Kuran suggests, to litigate each and every partner separately. But a 
single litigation against any of the mufawada partners would suffice since “the 
mufawada partners are, from the point of view of third parties, like one 
individual. The price of a purchase made by one of them is collectable from the 
other”.31 Thus, for all practical purposes, the mufawada would fulfil the basic 
advantages of the corporation and eliminate the need for separate litigation 
against each and every mufawada partner. 
Finally, recent research has revealed that Islamic law does recognize the 
concept of judicial personality. Indeed, it has been argued that a doctrine called 
dhimma constituted a nearly perfect substitute for it.32 The dhimma, very much 
like the corporation, is assumed to be an imaginary repository that contains all 
                                                            
30 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, p. 109. 
31 Ibid., p. 109. 
32 Zahraa, “Legal Personality”, p. 202. 
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the rights and obligations relating to a person in the present and the future. Most 
recently, it has been reported that the concept can be found in the classical 
sources of Islamic jurisprudence. It would be appropriate to quote Mustafa 
Zarqa`s forceful comment here: 
“When we referred to the original texts and sources of the Shari`ah, we found in 
it legal provisions which in substance propound the concept of juristic person and 
its legal status. And also, we found the legal provisions, which personify the 
juristic person with all its principles and characteristics, which are attributed to it 
by the latest (western) law...the legal position of the juristic person is found in the 
Shari`ah in the most perfect form in the shape of treasury, waqf and the state...”33     
 
An Alternative Explanation: 
If we are rejecting Kuran’s argument on the grounds that the Islamic 
jurisprudence did not impede corporations or primogeniture, why indeed then 
did partnerships or firms remain so small in the Islamic world? This is a 
crucially important question. Because, failure to create long lasting and 
powerful companies proved to be disastrous in the long run. Industrialization 
could not be achieved without powerful firms with large capital and when the 
time came for railways to be built, telegraph lines to be laid, in short, 
modernization projects so crucial for the survival of a nation had to be financed, 
                                                            
33 In Sanusi, “The Concept”, forthcoming. 
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Islamic empires of the nineteenth century had to turn to foreign banks and that 
led to financial imperialism.34  
It will be argued here that neither the supposedly immediate dissolution of the 
partnership upon the death of one of the partners nor the multitude of heirs 
caused by the Islamic law of inheritance, nor the alleged absence of judicial 
personality can account for the absence of the corporate form in the world of 
Islam. There was, however, one powerful reason: the corporate form was simply 
not needed and true to the spirit of the Coase theorem,35 because it was not 
needed, the corporation simply did not emerge in the Islamic world until well 
into the nineteenth century.36 Let us now examine why this important institution 
was not needed in the pre-industrial Islamic world. 
The Geographical Factor: 
                                                            
34 For the original version of this argument made for China see; Faure, China and Capitalism, 
p. 25.  
35 Coase Theorem as interpreted by Kindleberger: “institutions respond to supply and 
demand, or to economic necessity. They always spring into being to perform necessary 
economic tasks”, in Kindleberger, A Financial History, pp. 3-4, 44, 74, 206. 
36 Currently corporations have been completely accepted in the Islamic world. Even the 
modern Islamic banks have been established as corporations. 
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To start with, known ever since the late eleventh century, the corporation was 
adopted by the European business community with a huge lag of half a 
millennium. This is not to say that the European business community was not 
aware of the corporate form. Indeed, as early as the eleventh century Flemish 
merchants had organized themselves within incorporated guilds. The thirteenth 
century Hanses were also organized as corporations.37 But neither the guilds nor 
the Hanses were firms. It is not accidental that the emergence of incorporated 
firms by and large had to wait until the sixteenth century, because that was 
when the need surfaced in Europe. First came the Papal bull of 1494, known as 
the Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided the New World between the Spanish 
and the Portuguese and kept out all other European nations from the spice trade. 
Then came the unification of the Spanish and the Portuguese crowns in 1580. 
This was soon followed by the closure of the port of Lisbon to the Dutch and 
the English, thus effectively depriving these nations even from the re-export 
trade of the eastern spices.38 Both of these nations were at war with the now 
united Iberian crown and they decided that they had to reach the spice islands 
on their own. First the North-East and then the North-West routes were tried 
and when both ended disastrously, it was decided that the ships had to sail along 
                                                            
37 Çizakça, “Cross-Cultural Borrowing”, p. 689. 
38 That is to say, re-exporting the spices brought by the Portuguese and Spanish ships from 
the Far East, to the rest of Europe. 
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the known routes, across two oceans, the Atlantic and the Indian and, if 
necessary, fight the Iberians all the way to the Far East. For this, powerful and 
well-armed ships had to be built – a very expensive undertaking. Hence the 
need for corporation, which not only facilitated the pooling of large capital but 
also assured longevity for the firm. Both the English and the Dutch East India 
companies were incorporated joint-stock companies.39  
By contrast, Muslims had easy access to the spice islands. Indeed, when an 
Arab ship sailed off from Basra or the Hadramouth to India, it had already 
covered some four-fifth of the way a Dutch ship sailing off from Amsterdam 
had to cover. For the Arabs to sail to India was not so difficult because the 
routes and the sailing methods had been known and perfected centuries ago. 
Moreover, the Indian Ocean was a free trade zone, mare liberum, and Muslim 
shipping there was based upon small ships owned by just a few partners. There 
is evidence that Mediterranean ships were in general considerably larger than 
the Indian Ocean ships despite the fact that the former was a mere inland sea. It 
seems what determined the relative size of the ships was not so much the 
elements but rather the need to equip them for combat. Moreover, prevailing 
technology also played a role. While it was possible to make holes for cannons 
in the outer skin of the European ships, this was not possible for local Indian 
Ocean ships. Thus, to the extent that large ships existed in the Muslim Indian 
                                                            
39 Van Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten; Keay, The Honorable Company. passim. 
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Ocean shipping, these ships were designed to carry large numbers of pilgrims 
and cargo, but not cannons.40  In short, geography and politics made it 
imperative for the Europeans to incorporate, while this was not the case for the 
Muslims.  
Property Rights: 
Another important reason why Islamic firms remained ephemeral and small, 
was the concept of property rights. According to Douglass C. North,  there is a 
direct relationship between property rights and firm size, with insecure property 
rights leading to small firm size.41 If so, it would be appropriate here to 
investigate the prevailing property rights in the Islamic world with the 
hypothesis that small firm size may well have been caused by imperfect 
property rights.  
Since the corporate form was applied to European business primarily during the 
fifteenth – sixteenth centuries, we must investigate the status of property rights 
in the Islamic world for the corresponding period. During this particular period, 
the Islamic world was dominated by three great empires. These were from the 
West to the East; the Ottoman, the Safewid and the Mughal empires. 
Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of property rights can only be made for the 
                                                            
40 Utku, Kızıldeniz’de, pp. 241, 244. 
41 North, Institutions, p. 65. 
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Ottoman Empire. This is because, Safewid and Mughal archives have been 
destroyed to a large extent. By contrast, surviving Ottoman archives contain 
more than four hundred million documents. So, the question boils down to the 
extent of the Ottoman property rights during the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries. 
As in most societies, in the Ottoman Empire also, the mercantile class had the 
greatest potential for advancement. Within the Ottoman command economy, 
however, the mercantile class was effectively prevented from advancing its 
status. The Ottoman economic system aimed at the preservation of harmony 
between the classes. To preserve this harmony, the state applied pressure upon 
the mercantile class and ended up choking it. Recently, Stoianovich as well as 
Inalcık and Quataert have also described the Ottoman economy during the 
period 1300-1800, in similar fashion, as a “command economy”.42 
Actually, in order to maintain harmony between the classes not only the 
mercantile class but even the military/ruling class, askerî, was prevented from 
advancing too far. While in power, some members of this class could earn 
massive salaries and other income related to their positions. But this income 
could be earned only as long as the person remained employed and his tenure 
                                                            
42 Stoianovich, “Cities”; Inalcık and Quataert, Economic and Social History, pp. 1, 45-47. 
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continued. When the person retired or fell from favour, his income was either 
confiscated or reduced to one percent of what it was.43  
Being appointed as celepkeşan was another way accumulated wealth could be 
encroached upon. Celepkeşan were the unfortunate wealthy individuals, usually 
merchants or usurers, who were appointed as celeps to purchase large numbers 
of sheep in the Balkans at market prices and then sell these in Istanbul at the 
prevailing state imposed narh prices, which were less than the purchase prices.44 
Consequently, being appointed a celep almost always meant financial ruin. The 
system lasted from the late fifteenth century to 1597. It can be stated without 
any reservation that while it lasted, that is, for at least a century, the system 
must have impeded capital accumulation significantly. Indeed, the celepkeşan 
system targeted the accumulated wealth of the rich and distributed it to the 
masses. It goes without saying that such policies contrast sharply with the 
principles of classical Islamic capitalism. How the Islamic economic thought 
evolved from the latter to the former remains an important area of research.45  
                                                            
43 When Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi fell from favor, he was cruelly tortured to make him 
reveal the whereabouts of his hidden treasure. I owe this point to Erol Özvar. Also see on 
this; Abou-el-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion, p. 80. 
44 Greenwood, Meat Provisioning, p. 279. 
45 For more on this see; Çizakça, Islamic Capitalism, forthcoming. 
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Actually, the Ottoman celepkeşan, should be considered as a special form of the 
much more important, long lasting and more general institution of confiscation. 
Indeed, while the celepkeşan lasted for merely a century, confiscation can be 
traced to the very beginnings of Islam. There are several ahadith reporting that 
when informed about some embezzlements committed by an official, the 
Prophet became very angry and declared: “misappropriation by an official of 
even the smallest item is betrayal and theft”. Probably based upon this hadith, 
Caliph Omar (d. 644) began to apply systematic confiscation of corrupt 
officials. At that period the usual practice was to confiscate half of the property 
of the official in question.46 Under the Umayyads (661-750) not only 
confiscations increased in frequency and became an instrument of threat and 
revenge, but they were also institutionalized with the establishment of a special 
office of confiscations, Dar al-istihraj. When the Abbasids came to power in 
750 A.D., they not only executed members of the Umayyad dynasty but also 
confiscated their wealth. Abbasids established a special court of confiscation, 
known as the Divan al-mezalim. Under the Abbasids confiscations were also 
extended to the properties of the companions’ and the relatives’ of the corrupt 
official. Between the years 908-946 thirty and in the period 946-991, ten 
confiscations have been recorded.47 Extension of confiscations to the wealth of 
                                                            
46 Tomar, “Müsadere”, passim. 
47 ibid. p. 65. 
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the civilians seems to have occurred for the first time, again, under the 
Abbasids. In Egypt, members of the Tulunid dynasty (868-905) also could not 
escape confiscation when they fell from power. Confiscation of the wealth of 
the officials as well as innocent civilians continued under the Fatimids (909-
1171). It is well known, for instance, that Caliph Muiz had his vizier collect 
390.000 dinars from the peoples of Fustat and Tinnis.48 But members of the 
Fatimid dynasty and their officials also faced the same faith when the Ayyubids 
confiscated their wealth. In Egypt, the most extensive application of 
confiscations occurred under the Mamluks. This is because, Mamluks were not 
organized as a dynasty and any one of their members could assume power. So, 
the ruling elite resorted to the confiscation of their potential rivals ruthlessly. 
Thus, for the Mamluk ruling elite, confiscation was an instrument of eliminating 
the rivals. In central Asia, Ghaznavids and in Iran Selcukids also applied 
confiscations extensively.  
Under the Ottomans, confiscations had to wait until the concentration of power 
at the hands of the dynasty. When Musa Çelebi attempted to resort to 
confiscations prematurely, he lost the throne to his brother Çelebi Mehmet. The 
first major well known Ottoman confiscation occurred during the reign of 
Mehmed II in the second half of the fifteenth century. Following the 
centralization of power in this period, confiscations were extended to all 
                                                            
48 ibid. p. 66 
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important officials regardless of their guilt or failure. This is because, all wealth 
accumulated by a government official was regarded as originally belonging to 
the state and therefore considered liable to confiscation. Legitimised in this 
way, confiscations were normally limited to the members of the military/ruling 
class. But as the Empire began to fight wars on three fronts with European 
powers, plus Iran, defeats began to occur by the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and confiscations were extended to non-military class individuals as 
well. Moreover, confiscations did not remain limited to the capital but were 
extended to the provinces. Lower level provincial officers also began to 
confiscate the properties not only of their rivals but of the innocent wealthy as 
well. During the 1768-1774 war with Russia, even the modest properties of 
small scale craftsmen were confiscated. In the early nineteenth century Mahmud 
II resorted to confiscations to wipe out the power of the provincial ayans. This 
same sultan did not hesitate to confiscate even the waqf properties of the 
abolished janissary corps.49 
One case from the eighteenth century Diyarbakır, a remote province, is 
particularly revealing. We are informed by Mehmet Genç that when a major 
merchant died in Diyarbakır, his wealth was confiscated. Normally, according 
to Islamic law, the state is not permitted to do this to the rightfully earned 
                                                            
49 Öğün, “Müsadere; Osmanlılarda”, pp. 67-68. Confiscations became illegal in the Ottoman 
empire as late as the year 1839.  
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property of a free Muslim. Indeed, protection of property, hifz al-mal, is 
considered to be one of the tenets, even a raison d’être of Islamic law.50 But the 
argument put forward by the officials to legitimize this confiscation, in itself, 
was most revealing. Indeed, it had been argued that a fortune of this magnitude 
could not have been accumulated by trade. It could only have been accumulated 
by tax-farming. Since tax-farmers were members of the ruling class, the askerî, 
the deceased could be considered a member of the military/ruling class. 
Therefore, his wealth could be confiscated!51  
This case reveals a number of important points. First, beginning with the 
disastrous second siege of Vienna in 1683, the state was forced to take extra-
ordinary steps. One of them was extending confiscations to civilians despite the 
fact that fortunes collected by the private sector were considerably less. Indeed, 
the wealth of this merchant was about one-half or even one-fourth of the fortune 
of an average member of a military/ruling class person.52 Second, the argument 
                                                            
50 Çizakça, “Democracy”, passim. 
51 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, p. 75. 
52 Genç, ibid. p. 75. In some extreme cases, fortunes collected by high level military class 
members could reach to staggering proportions. When the failed commander in charge of the 
second siege of Vienna, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, was executed, his confiscated wealth 
stood at the staggering figure of 225.000.000 akçes. This was about 20% of the revenue of 
the  Central Treasury for that year. Özvar, Malikâne Uygulaması, p. 16-17. 
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used for this unusual step reveals that merchants’ profits must have been 
somehow controlled, because it is taken for granted that trade does not enable a 
person to accumulate much wealth. Third, the argument that substantial wealth 
can only be accumulated by tax-farming suggests that there must have been 
different rates of profits associated with different sectors in the economy. It is 
indeed clear from the text of the document that profits in tax-farming must have 
been allowed to be higher, probably significantly higher, than in other sectors.53 
This suggests the existence of a massive crowding-out effect in the Ottoman 
economy leading to a flow of investable funds from all sectors to tax-farming, 
where higher profits were permitted. Put differently, the bulk of the savings of 
the private sector available for private investment must have been sucked in by 
the state sector through tax-farming, leaving little for private investment.54 This 
is indirectly confirmed by Nelly Hanna,55 who has documented that the famous 
                                                            
53 During a conference convened in Artvin, Turkey in June 2009, Genç has pointed out to the 
possibility that profits even in tax-farming were controlled. But the text of the document 
leaves no room for doubt that still tax-farming profits must have been significantly higher 
than those prevailing in commerce. 
54 This, in itself, must have been very harmful for the economy. Because funds were 
withdrawn from the most productive sector of the economy, the private sector, into the least 
productive one, the state sector. 
55 Hanna, Big Money, p. 41. 
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merchants of the seventeenth century Egypt, the Abu Taqiyyas, shifted their 
investments from trade to tax-farming indicating the prevalence of higher 
profits in that sector- a clear case of the state sector crowding-out the private 
sector.56  
The essence of above arguments is the existence of different rates of profit 
permitted in the economy. This needs to be examined further. Based upon a 
decree dated 1501, Ömer Lütfi Barkan informed us long ago that, possibly from 
the middle of the fifteenth century but, definitively from the beginning of the 
sixteenth until the second half of the nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman state 
controlled prices and through prices, the profits. Moreover, artisans were 
normally not permitted to earn profits of more than 10 percent. Genç confirms 
this and reports that throughout this period, the Ottoman state constrained the 
profit rates for merchants and artisans to between 5 and 15 percent, the exact 
rate depending upon the nature of the activity.  
Since these maximum profit rates were sustained for more than three hundred 
years and observed operating in such diverse places as Istanbul, Bursa (Turkey), 
Salonica (Greece) and Cairo (Egypt), we can reach the conclusion that limiting 
profit rates of merchants and artisans by controlling prices was a general 
                                                            
56 Tax-farming was privatized tax collection. Though primarily a private sector activity, it is 
still considered as a state sector activity since the collection process was institutionalized by 
the state and the taxes thus collected were channeled to it.  
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Ottoman policy.57 These low profit rates are definitively confirmed by a law 
from the reign of Mehmed IV, dated 1680, which promulgated clearly that the 
urban grocers and merchants were to be permitted to earn 10 percent. If the 
activity was considered to be particularly difficult and labour intensive, a 20 
percent profit rate could be permitted. The law, tellingly, states that all 
commodities can be imposed maximum prices, the narh.58 But this law dated 
                                                            
57  Barkan, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde”, p. 340; Genç, “Osmanlılar”, p. 528. Şevket Pamuk, 
however, has warned that the Ottoman state applied a maximum price policy, narh, 
only during extra-ordinary times. See; his 500 Years of Prices, pp. 164-69. While this 
may be true, Pamuk’s own data reveals that narh orders have been issued for 163 
years out of a total of 319 years between 1520-1839, i.e., roughly once every two 
years. Naturally, as Pamuk argues, narh imposition was clustered around difficult 
years.  Moreover, this does not take into consideration the multiple narh orders issued 
in a single year. Thus at least half of the period in question has witnessed narh 
imposition. Since narh imposition implies low profits, we are not surprised that low 
profit rates have been confirmed by the Islamic court registers as well. Consider the 
following cases found in the Ottoman Court Registers in 1672 (4.5 percent - silk 
trade), 1801 (8 percent - grocery) and 1803 (6 percent - stone masons) see; Çizakça, 
Comparative Evolution, pp. 71-81.   
58 “Bilcümle şehir içinde bey’ u şira eden ehl-i hırefe nezaret olunub her kişinin harcını, 
sermayesini zahmetini görüb ve onu onbir üzere narh verile. Meğer gayet zahmetli ve emekli 
iş ola. Ol vakit onu oniki kâide konup tecâvüz olunmaya. Ve hiçbir nesne olmaya ki kadı ve 
muhtesib mârifetiyle narh verilmeye”, Ergin, Mecelle, vol. 1, p. 390.  That the generally 
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1680, essentially repeats the same profit rates promulgated by the 1501 one 
reported by Barkan. Such constantly low profit margins imposed by the state 
over the very long run confirm the insensitivity of the state to the needs of the 
merchants. In another law known as the Tevkıî Abdurrahman Paşa 
Kanunnâmesi, it is stated that unless a pertinent ferman is issued, prices cannot 
be increased or decreased. Indeed, narh did not always entail an increase in 
prices. Sometimes it involved a decrease, occasionally even substantially.59  
Moreover, since all production, from the raw material to the final product, was 
organised by the guilds, each guild tried to control the prices of the other, whose 
final product it consumed as its input. Thus input-output relations along the 
production process organized by the guilds, was another factor that helped 
control the maximum profit rates imposed by the state. The strictly guild and 
narh controlled production process appears to have functioned as a zero sum 
game, with any guild able to increase its profit rate only at the expense of that of 
another further along the production process. Consequently, the guilds 
controlled each other, both in terms of prices charged and profits earned. When 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
approved profit rate was 10 percent and for exceptionally difficult production processes upto 
20 percent, is also confirmed by Barkan, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde”, p. 340. 
59 In reality, narh prices were determined and administered by Kadıs supported by 
government officials. Occasionally the Sultans, themselves, ordered the imposition of narh. 
See, Kütükoğlu, Narh Müessesesi, p. 7, 12. 
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in case of conflict, a guild appealed to a court, the latter always ruled according 
to the rates and prices promulgated by the law. The mechanism of narh 
controlled prices continued, not only in Istanbul but also in the provincial cities, 
until the middle of the nineteenth century.60 
Under these conditions of limited profits, restricted property rights and 
controlled prices, it is no wonder that capital accumulation remained limited 
among the Ottoman merchants and artisans. Indeed, this is confirmed by various 
analyses of estates. Haim Gerber has shown that in the period 1600-1630 the 
artisans of Bursa on average left estates worth 66,163 akçes. This is not a high 
figure if we consider the fact that Gerber considers 20,000 akçes as the 
borderline of poverty. The average estate left by a merchant in the same period 
was worth 133,395 akçes, about 6.5 times the poverty line, again not a huge 
fortune. Moreover, 68 percent of the merchants left estates worth below 100,000 
akçes and only 5 percent had serious capital between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
akçes.61 Inalcık, in an article designed to demonstrate capital formation in the 
Ottoman economy, had to concede that even the richest guildsmen did not 
possess large capital sums.62 Research covering the period seventeenth-
                                                            
60 Kütükoğlu, ibid., p. 8, 18. 
61 Gerber, Economy and Society, pp. 21-29. 
62  İnalcık, “Capital Formation”, p. 135. 
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eighteenth centuries in Damascus (Syria) and Cairo (Egypt) has revealed that 
estates left by hundreds of craftsmen ranged between 400-1,000 gruş and by 
merchants between 1,500-4,000 gruş.63 
Profit controls imposed by the state, do not constitute the only impediment to 
the accumulation of mercantile capital. Another equally important factor is the 
relationship between profit rates and the prevailing rate of interest.64 Adam 
Smith has argued that an important condition for capital accumulation is that the 
interest rate (marginal cost of capital) should be about half as much as the 
“ordinary rate of clear profit”. In the Ottoman Empire roughly the reverse was 
true. Indeed, according to Smith’s condition, for Ottoman merchants to 
accumulate capital, the interest rate should have been about 2.5 to 10 percent, 
that is, half as much as the average rate of permitted profit of 5 to 20 percent. 
But the prevailing rates of interest in the unofficial Ottoman capital markets 
were between 15 to 25 percent.65 Thus merchants could have access to capital 
                                                            
63 Genç, “Osmanlılar”, p. 528. 
64 Despite the interest prohibition, unofficial yet de facto interest prevailed in the Ottoman 
capital market. 
65 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, p. 51.  Cash waqfs (charitable foundations established with cash) 
lent at around 11 to 12 percent “economic interest”, a situation, which naturally led to the 
emergence of a secondary capital market. Indeed, it has been shown that some trustees 
borrowed money from the very waqfs they managed in Bursa, only to lend it with a margin to 
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only at interest rates well in excess of the permitted profit rates, a situation 
certainly not conducive to capital accumulation. Among the contemporaries, it 
was Montesquieu, who noticed the higher rates of interest prevailing in Islamic 
countries. He attributed this to the prohibition of interest and the consequent 
increase in transaction costs associated with trying to evade the Islamic law.66 
Whatever the causes of these relatively high rates of interest may have been, the 
real impediment to capital accumulation was the considerably lower rates of 
permitted profitability vis a vis the prevailing very high rates of interest. 
Public finance constitutes an interesting exception to the generally much lower 
rates of profit prevailing in the economy. This indicates that this sector was 
given preferential treatment. In order to enhance the flow of private capital to 
the public sector, the sarrafs, who financed most public finance transactions, 
were allowed to pay up to 15 percent for deposits in order to allow them to 
attract capital to finance tax-farming. When they loaned to tax-farmers they 
were permitted to charge 20-25 percent interest.67 Once again, these very high 
rates of interest were clearly beyond the means of merchants whose profit rates 
were kept well below 20 percent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the money dealers in Istanbul. Çizakça,  Philanthropic Foundations, p. 49. This has been 
confirmed most recently by Deguilhem, Wakf, p. 89.  
66  Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pp. 96-97. 
67 Genç, “Osmanlı Ekonomisi”, forthcoming.  
38 
 
Conclusion: 
To sum up, it was the Ottoman economic policy which impeded accumulation 
of capital.  Under these circumstances of geography, price and profit controls, 
high interest rates, property rights restrictions, wide-spread confiscations and 
sustained crowding-out effect, the corporate form was simply not needed. 
Indeed, forming a corporation and accumulating large fortunes would have 
invited instant confiscation. Thus we conclude, it was the peculiar 
characteristics of the Ottoman command economy rather than the alleged 
rigidity of Shari’a which was responsible for the lack of the corporate form, the 
short life span and lack of capital accumulation in the Islamic world.68 
                                                            
68 This conclusion can only be vindicated by a comparative study of the history of property 
rights in the world of Islam and the West – a task well beyond the present confines of this 
work. It should suffice here to say that some European countries like England and the 
Netherlands, where mercants had more political influence, enjoyed better property rights. In 
England, the turning point came with the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Absolutist 
monarchies, like Spain and France did not provide such extensive property rights. The result 
was reflected in relative growth rates as well as real wages. See; North and Thomas, The 
Rise; North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment”, pp. 803-32. On real wages see; 
Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages”, pp. 293-321, 312-14. See also; Broadberry and Gupta 
”Great Divergence” pp. 2-31. Most recently, Dincecco was able to demonstrate that regimes 
where executive discretion was well controlled achieved much higher levels of revenue and 
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Furthermore, it will be argued here that all legal systems, Islamic included, 
sooner or later respond to the needs of the society. Thus, had the need surfaced, 
Muslim jurists would have responded and sanctioned the corporation. Indeed, 
from the waqf with perpetual life span to the corporation with judicial 
personality, it would have been but a small step. Actually, some jurists are 
convinced that Islamic law has always recognized judicial personality.69 
Therefore, the problem was not the rigidity of the Islamic law but a lack of need 
for the corporate form. But this lack of need was not caused, as Kuran has 
argued, by the rigidity of  the Shari’a and the Islamic law of inheritance but 
because of the restricted property rights, price/profit controls and confiscations 
observed in all Islamic empires, policies which culminated in the Ottoman 
command economy. Indeed, it was not the Shari’a but the Ottoman economic 
doctrine, which remained constant.70  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
therefore power. See, Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization”, pp. 48-104. 
 
69 Hatemi, Medeni Hukuk, pp. 35-53; Zahraa, “Legal Personality”, pp. 193-206; Sanusi, “The 
Concept”, forthcoming. 
70 The relative flexibility of Shari’ah was infact confirmed by recent research, which 
demonstrated that notwithstanding the claims of some orientalists, the “Gate of  Ijtihad” was 
in fact never closed. Therefore, Muslim jurists could have, indeed, easily created the 
corporation had it been needed. See, Ali-Karamali and Dunne, “The Ijtihad Controversy”, pp. 
238-57. Approval of the cash waqfs after a long debate in 1586 also confirms this flexibility. 
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Admittedly, the evidence presented here primarily pertains to the Ottoman 
empire, which covered for four centuries about one-fourth to one-third of the 
Islamic world. This evidence therefore has provided only a partial refutation of 
Timur Kuran’s arguments. A more definitive test can only be provided if 
economic historians of Iran, central Asia, the Indian sub-continent and the 
Malay world also join the debate. It is therefore hoped that this article will serve 
as an invitation to these colleagues. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
For further details on this see; Demir, Ebussuud Efendi, p. 164. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the Ottoman economic doctrine remained constant from its early beginnings in the 
fourteenth century to the nineteenth. It is for this reason that Genç has identified these five 
hundred years as “the classical age” of the Ottoman empire. See; Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, 
pp. 92-93. 
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